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EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY AND REMEDIES

EXTRACONTRACTUAL

liability and alternative theories of recovery from insurers figured prominently during the Texas Survey
period. While the actual number of cases involving the breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing appears to have declined in recent
years, insureds and their insurers continue to struggle with the complexities of their legal relationship.
A.

1.

THE STOWERS DOCTRINE

Assumption of Settlement Duties

Because Texas does not recognize a cause of action for breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing in the context of third party liability
claims,' insureds increasingly have turned to the common law doctrine
2
created under G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co.
Under Stowers, Texas insurers have a duty to exercise ordinary care in
attempting to settle liability claims because of the insurers' right to take
complete and exclusive control of the insured's defense. Several significant Stowers decisions were published during the Texas Survey period.
In Rocor International, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,3 an
insured trucking company sued its excess liability carrier for bad faith. In
1989, one of Rocor's employees killed two highway patrol officers while
driving while intoxicated. Rocor's insurance consisted of a $1 million deductible it carried on itself, a $1 million primary policy, under which the
employer retained the right to defend itself at trial, and an $8 million
excess policy with National Union. The National Union policy did not
include a duty to defend the employer in the event of a lawsuit. Rocor,
through the efforts of its own attorney, determined that it was liable for
the subsequent action brought by the families of the deceased officers,
and began negotiating with the plaintiffs. When Rocor's liability became
apparent, National Union took over settlement negotiations but did not
reach a settlement until two years later. National Union directed that
mediation efforts be halted and that no offer be made. National Union
delayed settling the case for more than a year after it had assumed responsibility for settlement. The case ultimately settled in 1991 for almost
4
exactly the estimate made by Rocor's attorney in 1990.
Rocor sued National Union for the defense expenses it incurred during
the settlement negotiations, claiming National Union had engaged in unfair insurance practices and made material misrepresentations regarding
the settlement. The jury found that National Union had settled negligently and in bad faith and awarded Rocor $123,000 in damages plus in1. See Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Serv., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 28

(Tex. 1996).
2. 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, opinion adopted).
3. 995 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. granted).

4. See id. at 807.
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terest and attorney's fees. 5 The trial court later granted National Union's
motion for judgment7 non obstante verdicto.6 The original appellate opinion was withdrawn.
After an en banc rehearing, the court of appeals issued a plurality opinion. While five of the seven justices agreed that the insured had a common law cause of action against the excess carrier for negligently
assuming control of settlement negotiations when it had no duty to defend, four of the seven justices disagreed8 that the insured had a cause of
action under the Texas Insurance Code.
Rocor first argued that National Union violated the Texas Insurance
Code by not attempting in good faith to execute a fair settlement once
liability was reasonably clear.9 Citing Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co., 10 the court agreed, acknowledging the insured's right to
expect that, once all parties agreed on liability and damages, settlement
would follow with reasonable promptness and the insured's financial interests would be protected, especially since National Union took over the
settlement negotiations and negotiated with the insured's funds and those
of the primary carrier."1 The court rejected National Union's use of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Watson,12 which bars a third-party claimant from
having a cause of action as a third-party beneficiary of an insurance policy
for unfair settlement practices, by plainly stating that Rocor was not a
third-party claimant. 13 The court noted, however, that "Vail and Watson,
taken together, allow first-party claimants who qualify as consumers to
bring causes of action based on the DTPA [Deceptive Trade Practices
Act], as it incorporates provisions of the Insurance Code and the firstparty plaintiffs who do not qualify as consumers under the DTPA to bring
suit under the Insurance Code and the reasoning supplied in Vail."'1 4 Because Rocor did not qualify as a "consumer" under the DTPA since its
assets exceeded $25 million, the court treated the claim as one by an insured seeking direct damages incurred as a result of the insurance company's mishandling of a third-party claim.15 After determining that
Rocor was entitled to the protection of the Insurance Code, the court
held that the insured's evidence was sufficient to prove that National
5. See id. at 806.
6. See id.
7. See Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 966 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1998, opinion withdrawn and motion for en banc rehearing granted May 13,
1998).
8. See Rocor Int'l, Inc., 995 S.W.2d at 804.
9. See id. at 808.
10. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
11. See Rocor, 995 S.W.2d at 809.
12. 876 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1994).
13. See Rocor, 995 S.W.2d at 809.
14. Id. at 810 (citing Webb v. International Trucking Co., 909 S.W.2d 220, 226 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (stating that both the Insurance Code and DTPA grant
relief for unfair practices)).
15. See id. at 810-11.
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Union engaged in unfair settlement practices. 16
The court then considered Rocor's claim that it had a common law
negligence cause of action against National Union by virtue of the Stowers doctrine. Although National Union argued that Stowers did not apply
because it had no duty to defend under the terms of the excess agreement, the court noted that National Union assumed the duty to fairly
settle the claim against the insured when it took over the negotiations,
including negotiations involving funds that it did not control. 1 7 Noting
that the Rocor situation did not fall neatly into the Stowers doctrine, the
court found that National Union's assumption of the exclusive right to
negotiate a settlement gave rise to the special relationship upon which the
Stowers doctrine rests. 18 The court held that even though National Union
had no duty to defend Rocor, once it took over settlement negotiations in
the case it assumed the duty to fairly settle the claims against the insured.19 The Texas Supreme Court granted writ in this case on January
2000, and set submission of the case for March 2000.
2.

No Duty to Consider Non-Covered Claims

The Fifth Circuit recently considered whether carriers must consider
non-covered claims during settlement negotiations. In St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Convalescent Services, Inc. (CSI), 20 Schultz was
a patient at a nursing home owned by CSI. After Schultz developed various medical conditions requiring hospitalization, surgery and skin grafts,
he sued CSI for actual and punitive damages, alleging a variety of negligent acts and omissions that resulted in his serious personal injuries and
near death. St. Paul insured CSI, but its policy excluded coverage for
punitive damages. While St. Paul was defending CSI in the underlying
claim, Schultz made a settlement demand of $250,000, which was well
within CSI's policy limits. At the time, Schultz's medical expenses alone
were $80,000, but St. Paul rejected the offer and made a counteroffer of
$35,000. The case did not settle, and at trial a jury awarded Schultz
$380,000 in actual damages and $850,000 in punitive damages against
CSI.21 St. Paul paid the actual damages award against CSI, but refused to
pay the punitive damages award based on the policy exclusion.
CSI then pursued a Stowers action against St. Paul for its negligence in
the settlement negotiations. St. Paul sought a declaratory judgment for a
determination of no coverage for the punitive damages award in the same
suit. The trial court entered a judgment on the pleadings that St. Paul did
16. See id. at 811. The court rejected, however, Rocor's assertion that National
Union's alleged misrepresentations concerning the settlement negotiations was actionable
under Insurance Code article 21.21 §4 on grounds that the misrepresentations were not the
producing cause of Rocor's injuries. See id. at 814.
17. See id. at 812.
18. See id. at 812.
19. See id. at 813.
20. 193 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999).
21. See id. at 341.
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not breach its Stowers duty to CSI.22 The court also found that St. Paul
had no liability for the punitive damages award. 23 On appeal, CSI argued
that St. Paul's Stowers duty was triggered in this case because St. Paul
knew or had reason to know that CSI was willing to pay its share of any
demand for non-covered damages in order to avoid exposure to a large
award of punitive damages based on CSI's payment of $100,000 of its own
money the year before in settlement of an unrelated suit that posed a
large risk of punitive damages. 24 Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's
holding in American Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Garcia25 that an
insurer has no duty to settle a claim that is not covered under its policy,
the Fifth Circuit rejected CSI's argument that St. Paul had a duty to take
into consideration CSI's potential exposure to uncovered punitive dam26
ages during settlement negotiations of covered claims.
CSI also argued that regardless of Stowers, St. Paul had an independent
duty to accept reasonable settlement demands, based on the broad language of Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Guin,27 which extends
an insurer's duty of care to investigation, preparation for the defense of
the lawsuit, trial of the case, and reasonable attempts to settle. The Fifth
Circuit noted that the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Garcia had
"drastically curtailed" the broad language of Guin.28 The Fifth Circuit
also rejected CSI's reliance on cases from other jurisdictions which had
imposed a similar duty because those cases were founded in part on an
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing, a duty which the Texas Supreme Court expressly declined to extend to third-party claims in Maryland Insurance Co. v. Head IndustrialCoatings & Services, Inc. 29 Finally,
the Fifth Circuit noted that because Texas does not impose a duty upon
insurers to consider other covered claims when faced with a settlement
demand by one claimant, 30 there is no duty for the insurer to consider
claims that are not covered by the policy during settlement negotiations
3
involving one claimant. '
3.

Demand Within Policy Limits
Texas courts repeatedly reject Stowers claims that fail to meet the crite-

22. See id. at 341-42.
23. See id. at 342.

24. See id.
25. 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994).
26. See St. Paul, 193 F.3d at 343.

27. 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
28.
29.
30.
31.

See
938
See
See

St. Paul, 193 F.3d at 344.
S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1996).
Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994).
St. Paul, 193 F.3d at 345.

1130

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

ria set out in Garcia.32 The Houston Court of Appeals 33 rejected excess
insurer Westchester's claim for equitable subrogation against American
Contractors for breach of its Stowers duty when the initial settlement demand exceeded the primary carrier's policy limits. In this case, Phillips 66
had a $250,000 primary policy with American Contractors. Westchester
was the third-level excess carrier, responsible for amounts between $2
million and $4 million. Cooper, a U.S. Contractors employee working at
a Phillips 66 refinery, suffered severe injuries to his hand. Cooper sued
Phillips 66 for negligence. American Contractors believed Phillips 66
could prevail at trial by showing U.S. Contractors was responsible for
Cooper and that Cooper was more than fifty percent at fault in the
accident.
American Contractors' attorney estimated Cooper had as much as a
fifty percent chance of obtaining a negligence verdict, with damages likely
to range from $990,200 to $1.9 million. Cooper demanded $1.8 million to
settle the claim. American Contractors offered $5,000. At mediation,
American Contractors again offered the $5,000 and declined to increase
it; the mediation ended before Cooper made a counteroffer. At trial,
Cooper obtained damages of $5.1 million, plus $2.5 million in prejudgment interest. The case settled for $4.3 million, after Westchester contributed $1.3 million. 3 4 Westchester then sought reimbursement for the
amount it paid under a theory of equitable subrogation against American
Contractors. American Contractors obtained summary judgment. 35 On
appeal, Westchester contended a primary insurer should not be permitted
to engage in misconduct in settlement negotiations but the appeals court
refused to extend Stowers.36 Instead, relying on the fact that Cooper's
demand exceeded American Contractor's policy limits, the appeals panel
affirmed summary judgment. 37 Although technically correct, the Westchester case is disturbing because of the propensity of primary carriers or
self-insureds with low limits to "gamble" with the excess carrier's
38
money.
32. The Supreme Court of Texas states that
The Stowers duty is not activated by a settlement demand unless three prerequisites are met: (1) the claim against the insured is within the scope of
coverage, (2) the demand is within the policy limits, and (3) the terms of the
demand are such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it, considering the likelihood and degree of the insured's potential exposure to an excess
judgment.
Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 849.
33. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. American Contractors Ins. Co. Risk Retention
Group, 1 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
34. See id. at 873.
35. See id. at 873.
36. See id. at 872.
37. See id. at 874.
38. See, e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 841 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied). In American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., the
Texas Supreme Court reasoned that if excess carriers were not subrogated to the claims of
their insureds, primary insurers would have less incentive to settle within their policy limits
and might be tempted to "gamble" with excess carriers' money when potential judgments
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4. Implications of Soriano in Stowers
The Fifth Circuit provided a comprehensive analysis of the insurer's
dilemma when faced with a settlement of one insured's claims that leaves
its remaining insureds without protection under the policy. 39 Travelers
issued three insurance policies to Wright Petroleum, a wholesaler and retailer of petroleum products, a business auto policy, a catastrophe umbrella policy, and a comprehensive general liability policy. Citgo had a
franchise agreement with Wright, and the three policies named Citgo an
additional insured by endorsement. Both the business auto and umbrella
policies contained provisions giving Travelers the discretion to settle
claims and allowing Travelers to terminate its duty to defend upon exhaustion of the policy limits.
The underlying case arose from a collision involving one of Wright's
tanker trucks. Both the Wright employee and the driver of the other vehicle were killed. At the time of the accident, the truck was carrying petroleum products for Citgo. The survivors of the other driver sued Wright,
but did not initially sue Citgo. Travelers defended Wright.
The plaintiffs presented a settlement demand. Eventually, a release
was executed releasing Wright, the estate of the tanker truck driver, and
all others who were then named defendants in the lawsuit, in exchange
for Travelers tendering the full policy limits-$1.5 million-of both the
auto and the umbrella policies to the plaintiffs. Citgo, which at that time
was not and had never been named a defendant in the lawsuit and as to
which plaintiffs had not made any offer to settle, was not included in the
release. The plaintiffs then amended their complaint, adding Citgo, and
asserting negligence in its continued dealings with Wright. Citgo demanded a defense and indemnity from Travelers and Travelers refused,
citing in part the exhaustion of policy limits.
Travelers then brought a declaratory judgment action, and Citgo counterclaimed. The court acknowledged that Stowers requires that an insurer
accept an offer on behalf of its insured "when an ordinarily prudent insurer would do so .... ",40 The problem with that duty, the court acknowledged, is when an insurer settles pursuant to that duty and then exposes
itself to claims by insureds excluded from the settlement.
The court noted that this dilemma was resolved by the Texas Supreme
Court in situations involving multiple claimants. In Soriano, "evidence
that a larger claimant was willing to settle within policy limits (but had
not then made an offer) was deemed irrelevant in the absence of eviapproach the primary insurers' limits. 843 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. 1992). At some point, the
Texas Supreme Court may be forced to develop a hybrid Canal/Stowers cause of action in
order to resolve the complicated indemnity issues facing primary and excess carriers. Recently, the Fifth Circuit in General Star Indem. Co. v. Vesta Fire Ins. Corp., reversed a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedurel2(b)(6) motion to dismiss, finding an excess insurer is
legally entitled to assert a Stowers claim against the primary insurer via equitable subrogation principles. See 173 F.3d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1999).
39. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 166 F.3d 761 (5th Cir. 1999).
40. Id. at 764.
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dence that the settlement reached with the other claimant, considered
alone, was unreasonable."' 4 1 In situations involving multiple insureds,
rather than multiple claimants, the court noted that only two cases construing Texas law have addressed this problem. In the first case, the court
held that duties to additional insureds terminated when the settlement
43
exhausted the policy limits. 42 In the second case, Vitek, Inc. v. Floyd
the court allowed for the possibility that a co-insured might have an action against the insurer for breach of good faith under these circumstances. But the Citgo court noted that Texas "has since indicated that in
such a context an action for breach of good faith against the insurer can'44
not be maintained.
Citgo charged that when multiple insured parties, rather than multiple
claimants, are involved, the Soriano approach discourages settlement as a
partial settlement obtained under the Arnold rule does not prevent continued litigation against the exposed co-insured. 45 The court rejected
Citgo's position, noting that under such a rule "the only rational course
for insurers would be to formally or informally make all their insureds
parties to any settlement negotiations. No insurer would settle at its policy limits with potential excess liability to a disgruntled co-insured lurking
in the background. '46 The court opined that "mandatory interjection of
new parties and new issues into settlements that Citgo's rule would likely
produce seems calculated to increase the cost of negotiations and decrease the likelihood of their ultimate success. ' 47 The court ultimately
followed the Arnold rule that an insurer is not subject to liability for proceeding on behalf of a sued insured with a reasonable settlement once a
settlement demand is made, even if the settlement eliminates or reduces
limits of liability to a level insufficient for further settlement coverage for
a co-insured as to whom no demand has been made. 48 The Citgo decision
follows those jurisdictions holding that a carrier need only act in good
faith in securing a settlement and may settle on behalf of less than all
insureds.
The Fifth Circuit then reconsidered the same issue in a second case, in
which a house fire resulted in the deaths of five people. 49 The plaintiffs in
the underlying suit initially only sued Sparks, the property manager. To
resolve that claim, the excess insurer paid $500,000 of a $520,000 settlement. The primary carrier paid the balance. At that time, the primary
41. Id. at 765 (citing Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 314-15 (Tex.
1994)).
42. See American States Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 930 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996,
writ denied).
43. 51 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 1995).
44. Citgo, 166 F.3d at 766 (citing Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings and
Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. 1996)).
45. See id. at 766.
46. Id. at 767, n.5.
47. Id. at 767.
48. See id. at 768.
49. See Western Alliance Ins. Co. v. Northern Ins. Co., 176 F.3d 825 (5th Cir. 1999).
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and excess insurers agreed they would resolve their differences over coverage and allocation at the conclusion of all litigation arising out of the
house fire. Following the settlement of the claims against the property
manager, the plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit sued the FDIC, the property owner. The primary carrier ultimately tendered its policy limits. In
the insurance litigation that followed, the primary carrier argued that its
payment of policy limits to settle the FDIC claims precluded its liability
for any portion of the earlier Sparks settlement. The Fifth Circuit
disagreed:
[A]t that time Sparks was the only insured party named in the action,
and the primary policy limits were not exhausted. If the facts were
sufficient to trigger the duty to indemnify, that duty included the immediate payment of a settlement of up to $1 million. Northern's decision to subsequently extend the policy limits on behalf of the FDIC
cannot alter the fact that it may be liable to Sparks for the full value
of a settlement within policy limits. Under the facts of this case, we
hold that the exhaustion of Northern's primary policy liability in a
excuse Northern's asserted
subsequent proceeding could not serve to
50
earlier breach of its duty to indemnify.
Although the Fifth Circuit could not completely resolve the coverage
questions (due to an incomplete record) it reviewed the record and articulated its belief that the excess insurer was entitled to reimbursement
from the primary insurer and stated its belief regarding the excess insurer's entitlement to summary judgment if the missing pages from5 1the
record did not deviate from the factual findings made by the court.
B.

BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

Denise Castafieda's father applied for medical insurance with Provident American in May 1991 to cover his entire family. 52 During the application process, her father failed to disclose that just two days before he
applied for the policy, his son received medical attention for jaundice,
anemia, and suspected hepatitis. Denise received medical treatment for
jaundice and hepatitis several years before her brother. Provident American issued a policy to the family effective June 17, 1991, but with two
relevant limitations. First, the policy did not cover expenses resulting
from a sickness that manifests within thirty days of the policy's effective
date. Second, the policy excluded diseases or disorders of certain internal
organs, including the gallbladder, unless the loss occurred more than six
months after the policy's effective date. Shortly thereafter, the Castafiedas learned that another family member had been diagnosed with
hemolytic spherocytosis ("HS"), a hereditary condition causing misshapen red blood cells, and commenced HS screening for the rest of the
family. On July 20, 1991, the third day after the thirty day period, Cas50. See id. at 828-29.
51. See id. at 833.
52. See Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castafleda, 988 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1999).
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tafieda and her brother were diagnosed with HS. In August, she and her
brother each had their spleen and gallbladder removed. The Castafiedas
submitted the claims to Provident American, which denied it on the basis
of the six-month policy exclusion for internal organ disorders. After Castafieda's father explained that removal of the gallbladder was only secondary to HS, Provident American reopened the claim, but later denied it
on the ground that the HS disorder had manifested within thirty days of
the policy's effective date. Provident American yet again promised Castafieda that it would reconsider her claim, but failed to respond later.
Castafieda sued the carrier, claiming violations of the DTPA and the
Code. The trial court entered judgment for Castafieda on the jury's verdict, awarding $50,000 in actual damages based on a broad-form jury
question that allowed the jury to combine damages for lost policy benefits
and past loss of credit.5 3 The jury also awarded $100,000 in additional
damages-a twelve percent penalty under the Code on the lost benefits,
attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest. 54 The court of appeal reversed
the twelve percent penalty, but otherwise affirmed the trial court's
55
judgment.
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court considered three issues: (1)
whether Provident American denied the claim without a reasonable basis
or after liability had become reasonably clear; (2) whether there was a
misrepresentation about the policy; and (3) whether Provident American
engaged in unfair claims settlement practices. The court noted that during the claim dispute, Provident American gave varying reasons for denying Castafieda's claim, but all were grounded in a common nucleus of
facts. 56 The court pointed out that even if Castafieda's condition manifested outside of the thirty day period, that fact, standing alone, would
not constitute evidence of a bad faith denial of her claim. 57 The Castafieda siblings had exhibited symptoms even before their father applied
for the policy. In order to support a verdict, the court stated, Castafieda
was required to show some evidence that
no reasonable insurer could have believed that the condition had
manifested before the end of the thirty-day period (an objective
prong of the "no reasonable basis" definition of bad faith) and that
Provident American knew or should have known that it had no reasonable basis for denying the claim based on the thirty-day waiting
58
period (the second prong).
53. See id. at 192.
54. See id.
55. See Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castafleda, 914 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1996), rev'd, 988 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1999).
56. See id. at 193.
57. See Castafleda, 988 S.W.2d at 194. A bona fide coverage dispute does not demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for denying a claim. See id. (citing State Farm
Lloyds v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex. 1997); Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879
S.W.2d 10, 17 (Tex. 1994); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d 373
(Tex. 1994).
58. Castafteda, 988 S.W.2d at 195-96 (citing Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d at 376).
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The court emphasized that a finding of coverage
"is not the equivalent
'59
and cannot be the only evidence of bad faith."
The court also addressed whether denial of Castafieda's claim was improper under the six-month exclusion. Clearly, there was confusion even
within Provident American as to its applicability once one of Castafieda's
physicians opined that the removal of her gallbladder was secondary to
her HS condition. But the court declined to find that the confusion over
the exclusion amounted to evidence that no other reasonable insurance
company would have denied coverage in light of other facts. 60 Even
though one of Provident American's employees testified that it was improper to deny the claim based on the gallbladder exclusion, no employee
61
believed that the claim was payable based on the thirty-day provision.
Relying on its previous holding in Republic Insurance Co. v. Stoker,62 the
Castafieda court observed that even if Provident American's reliance on
the gallbladder exclusion was misplaced, there were ample facts to support reliance on the thirty-day exclusion at virtually every stage of the
claim. 63 As a result, the court found that there was no evidence that
Providence American's liability under the policy was reasonably clear
when it denied coverage or that it had no reasonable basis for denying
64
coverage.
Castafieda also contended that she was entitled to recover damages
equivalent to policy benefits because Provident American failed to acknowledge communications about the claim or failed to adopt reasonable
standards for investigating claims. The court noted that the "failure to
properly investigate a claim is not a basis for obtaining policy benefits,"
but might be a basis for damages "to the insured other than policy benefits or damages flowing from the denial of the claim if the insurer mishandled the claim."'65 The court also rejected Castafieda's claim that
Provident American's preapproval of her surgery was an acknowledgment of coverage, and its subsequent failure to pay her claim was a violation of the Code and the DTPA.66 While the court declined to hold that
preapproval of medical procedures can never constitute an actionable
representation under article 21.21 or the DTPA, the court found that
adopting "Castafieda's position ... would impose strict liability on carriers that are not given pertinent facts before a procedure is pre-approved
and who later learn that they have a good faith, reasonable basis for denying coverage. ' 67 The court also noted that there was no evidence that
Castafieda relied on the preapproval to her detriment and would have
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 196.
See id. at 197.
See id.
903 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. 1995).
See Castafieda, 988 S.W.2d at 197.
See id.
Id. (citing Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341).
See id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
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foregone the surgery if there had been no preapproval. 6 8
Finally, the court rejected Castafieda's claim that Provident American's
conduct was unconscionable under the DTPA. The court observed that
there was no evidence that Provident American took advantage of the
lack of knowledge, ability, experience or capacity "of Castafieda to a
grossly unfair degree or that its conduct resulted in a 'gross disparity between value received and consideration paid." 69 The court noted that
even if the policy did not cover the HS claim, the policy was not "valueless," as Castafieda contended, because "it covered a myriad of other ill'70
nesses Castafieda could have contracted while the policy was in effect."
Because the judgment against Provident American was not supported by
legally sufficient evidence, the court reversed the decision of the court of
71
appeals and rendered that Castafieda take nothing.
II.

GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
A.

DuTY -rO

DEFEND

In a recent case, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") sued St.
Paul, the general liability insurer of a highway construction contractor,
for a declaration that its policy covered DOT as an additional insured
against claims arising out of flooding caused by the highway. 72 The DOT
contended that St. Paul owed it a defense under an additional insured
endorsement that provided coverage for injury or damage resulting from
the contractor's work for DOT, or the DOT's general supervision of the
work. St. Paul argued that it had no duty to defend the DOT because the
underlying petition failed to allege facts or claims for damages that would
trigger a duty to defend, or at most it was only obligated to defend certain
covered claims.
The court of appeals examined the underlying petition in light of the
"eight corners" rule. 7 3 The petition alleged the DOT and the contractor
designed, scheduled, constructed, and supervised the construction of the
highway and its drainage channels. The court noted that this allegation
could be read to allege that the contractor failed to construct the highway
with adequate flood-control measures, the DOT supervised the construction, and the acts of both the contractor and the DOT caused the plain68. See Castaneda, 988 S.W. 2d at 200.
69. Id. at 200-01.
70. Id. at 201.
71. See id.
72. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 999 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. App.-Austin
1999, writ denied).
73. See id. at 884-85. An insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allegations in
the pleadings and the language of the insurance policy. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 1,39, 141 (Tex. 1997); Trinity Universal Ins.
Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. 1997); American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia,
876 S.W.2d 842, 847-48 (Tex. 1994). This is known as the "eight corners" rule. See National Union, 939 S.W.2d at 141. The "eight corners" rule is also sometimes called the
"complaint allegation" rule. See Cowan, 945 S.W.2d at 821; Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 847-48.
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tiffs' injuries.74 The court specifically rejected St. Paul's argument that
vicarious liability had to be alleged against DOT before the provisions of
the additional insured endorsement were triggered. 75 The court noted
the DOT's
that it was plain from the endorsement that an allegation of
76
direct negligence was sufficient to trigger a duty to defend.
St. Paul also maintained that the policy's intentional injury exclusion
precluded coverage for gross negligence or intentional torts. The court
observed, however, that the negligent supervision allegations against the
DOT could naturally be read to encompass ordinary negligence, as well
as gross negligence or intentional torts.77 In spite of the fact that the
torts,
petition alleged legal theories of gross negligence and intentional
78
the facts alleged were controlling over the legal theories.
B. OCCURRENCE
Unpublished decisions are generally not recognized as authority by
courts, especially when such decisions are generated from a lower court.
But the next opinion is significant because of its apparent acknowledgment of the difficult task of interpreting the term "occurrence" in insurance policies. McKinney was sued by two homeowners who were
informed that their houses encroached on neighboring lots. 79 After McKinney assumed responsibility, the homeowners sued alleging negligence
in misplacing the houses, negligence in hiring surveyors, misrepresentation and fraud. McKinney sought defense and indemnity from Nationwide under its general liability and umbrella policies. Nationwide denied
coverage, asserting the fact that McKinney mistakenly built the houses on
the wrong spots did not constitute an accident or occurrence.
As support, Nationwide relied on Argonaut Southwest Insurance Co. v.
Maupin80 and Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Gerrits.81 In Maupin,
the Texas Supreme Court held that the insured was not entitled to coverage for a suit alleging trespass for the insured's acts of removing borrow
material from property. 82 The Maupin court acknowledged that while
the insured's mistaken belief regarding the identity of the owner of the
property arguably indicated no intent by the insured to injure, the act
itself, the removal of the borrow material, was intentional, deliberate and,
thus, not an accident. 83 The Maupin court relied in part on Gerrits, in
which the insured used an erroneous property survey to construct a house
74. See St. Paul Ins. Co., 999 S.W.2d at 884-85.
75. See id. at 885-86.
76. See id. at 886.
77. See id. at 887.
78. See id.
79. McKinney Builders v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:97-CV-3053-R, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12559, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999).
80. 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1973).
81. 65 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1953).

82. See Maupin, 500 S.W. 2d at 635.
83. See id.
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which was later discovered to encroach upon a neighboring lot. 84 The

Gerrits court found the resulting suit was not covered, holding that a
"mistake of fact" occurred and the resulting encroachment was the "natural and probable" consequence of the erroneous survey.8 5 Therefore, the
Gerritscourt concluded, there was no accident.8 6 The McKinney Builders
court rejected Maupin and Gerrits as sound precedent because the Florida Supreme Court has since modified its position on the term "accident." 87 The McKinney Builders court concluded that the underlying
complaint alleged an "occurrence" because the alleged damages
were un88
designed or unexpected from the standpoint of McKinney.
84. See id.
85. See Gerrits, 65 So.2d at 70-71.
86. See id. at 71.
87. See McKinney Builders, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12559, at *15. In State Farm Fire
and Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., the Supreme Court of Florida held that the term "accident" in an insurance policy "includes not only 'accidental events,' but also damages or
injuries that are neither expected nor intended from the viewpoint of the insured." 720
So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1998). Arguably, there are two lines of "occurrence" cases in Texas. The
line of cases following Maupin pertains to coverage of claims against an insured for damage caused by its alleged intentional torts. Maupin, supra note 80. According to this body
of law, damage that is the natural result of voluntary and intentional acts is deemed not to
have been caused by an occurrence, no matter how unexpected, unforeseen, and unintended that damage may be. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brooks, 43 F.Supp. 2d
695, 702 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (concluding that a claim brought against an insured for damages
resulting from "unconsenting sexual acts" is a claim for damages resulting from an intentional act which is not a covered "occurrence"); Metropolitan Property & Cas. Co. v. Murphy, 896 F. Supp. 645, 648 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (concluding that a woman's claim against
Murphy, for secretly watching her shower, bathe, dress, and sleep through holes he had
drilled in her bathroom and bedroom walls, was based on allegations of intentional conduct that did not satisfy the policy's definition of "occurrence"); Trinity Universal Ins. Co.
v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 828 (Tex. 1997) (concluding that a photo lab clerk's intentional
act of replicating photographs of a woman and showing them to friends was not an "accident" within the meaning of the clerk's homeowners' liability policy, even though the clerk
did not intend to cause harm to the woman, because the injury of which the woman complained-the invasion of her privacy-could be reasonably anticipated from the clerk's
conduct); Baldwin v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 750 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1988, writ denied) (denying plaintiff's claim for damage incurred when his insurer refused
to defend him in a suit brought by the state for alleged repeated and intentional highway
size and weight violations). In cases involving claims against an insured for damage arising
out of his alleged negligence, however, a second line of cases has developed following
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 416 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. 1967).
See, e.g., Lafarge Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that unintended damage to a pipeline caused by the defective coating supplied by insured's
subsidiary was caused by an "occurrence" within the meaning of the liability policy); Hartford Cas. Co. v. Cruse, 938 F.2d 601, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that extensive
damage to plaintiffs' home caused by insured's defectively performed foundation leveling
services was unexpected and unintended and, therefore, was caused by an "occurrence"
within the meaning of the policy); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Volentine, 578 S.W.2d 501,503 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979) (concluding that the destruction of an entire engine as the
result of the malfunction of one repaired valve was unexpected and unintended); Employers Cas. Co. v. Brown-McKee, Inc. 430 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968) (concluding that manufacturer's alleged improper construction and repair of concrete grain
storage elevator was an "accident" for the purposes of insurance coverage and defense
because it brought about damage that was "an unexpected, unforeseen or undesigned happening or consequence from 'either a known or unknown cause.").
88. See McKinney Builders, 199 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12559 at *19-20.
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Nationwide also asserted the underlying allegations of diminution in
value of the homes did not constitute "property damage" because it was a
purely ecnomic loss. 89 The McKinney Builders court found the underlying complaint alleged property damage because it claimed loss of use,
which was covered under both policies. 90 Moreover, "encroachment"
constitutes property damage, the court held. 91
Finally, the court rejected Nationwide's application of two exclusions
to the case. The court found the "your work" exclusion inapplicable because the underlying complaint alleged property damage based on physically injured property. 92 Construing the allegations as property damage
to "impaired property" created an ambiguity that should be construed
against Nationwide, the court added. 93 In addition, the court applied its
finding to Nationwide's94 argument that the exclusion for failure to perform barred coverage.
C.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY EXCLUSION

In Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Texas Security Concepts & Investigation,95 the Fifth Circuit upheld the applicability of an assault and battery
exclusion in a general liability policy issued to a security company. Two
women alleged that they were falsely imprisoned and sexually assaulted
at a Houston apartment complex. The women sued Texas Security for
negligently failing to provide proper security at the complex. Scottsdale,
Texas Security's general liability carrier, filed a declaratory judgment action against its insured and the women. After the insureds failed to answer the suit and defaulted, the trial court granted summary judgment in
89. See McKinney Builders, 199 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12559 at *21. The CGL policy defined "property damage" as "physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting
loss of use of that property; or loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured." Id. at *22. The umbrella policy defined the term as "physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy period, including all resulting loss
of use of that property[; or] loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically
injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy
period." Id.
90. See McKinney Builders, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12559, at *27-30.
91. Id. at *23-24 (citing Saks v. Nicosia Contracting Corp., 215 A.D.2d 832, 625
N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) ("'There can be little doubt that the real property on which the [misplaced] house encroaches sustained damage, and we are of the view
that there was corresponding damage to plaintiffs' real property because of the
encroachment.' ")).
92. Id. at 27-28. This exclusion, exclusion (m), excluded "'[p]roperty damage' to 'impaired property' or property that has not been physically injured, arising out of: a defect,
deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in 'your product' or 'your work'; or a delay
or failure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to perform a contract or agreement in
accordance with its terms." Id. at *27.
93. See id. at *30.
94. See id. The failure to perform exclusion precludes coverage for loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed, resulting from a delay or
lack of performance by the insured or the failure of the insured's products or work performed by the insured or on the insured's behalf to meet the level of performance warranted. See id.
95. 173 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 1999).
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favor of Scottsdale and against the women. 96 On appeal, the women contended that (1) the assault and battery exclusion was void since it was
against Texas public policy and (2) some of their claims fell outside the
exclusion.
The Texas statute regulating the licensing of private security agencies at
the time required that the licensing board verify that each security agency
seeking a license held a general liability policy which would provide coverage for the security business activities of the agency. 97 The women contended that because the attachment of the assault and battery exclusion is
counterproductive to the mandate of the statute, the assault and battery
exclusion is void as a violation of Texas public policy. The Fifth Circuit
agreed, however, with Scottsdale that the security agency's failure to procure the appropriate insurance was an issue between the security company and the regulating agency. 98 Noting that the statute was regulatory
in nature, the court held that the statute did not affirmatively establish a
public policy of the state which would override the contractual agreement
between the security agency and the insurance company. 99
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the women's claim that their underlying
personal injury suit implicitly stated claims for false imprisonment which
were not subject to the assault and battery exclusion. The court stated
that "[w]hen an exclusion precludes coverage for injuries 'arising out of'
described conduct, the exclusion is given a broad, general, and comprehensive interpretation."100 Accordingly, the court determined that a
claim need only bear an incidental relationship to the described conduct
for the exclusion to apply. 10 1 Noting that "the rape, assault, and unlawful
restraint all occurred concurrently and as a part of the same sequence of
events," the Fifth Circuit held that the false imprisonment claims of the
1 02
women by the assault and battery exclusion.
D.

POLLUTION EXCLUSION

In Kelley-Coppedge Inc. v. Highlands Insurance Co.,1°3 KCI, an oil and
gas pipeline independent contractor, inadvertently struck a Mobil Oil
pipeline while laying pipe along an easement. The act caused 1,600 barrels of crude oil to spill and damage a third party's land upon which the
easement was located. Highlands, KCI's general liability insurer, paid to
repair the pipeline and paid for the lost oil, but refused to pay KCI's
clean-up costs under its policy. KCI sued Highlands for a declaration of
the carrier's coverage obligations. The trial court found that Highlands'
96. See id. at 942.

97. See id. at 942.
1999).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

TEX. REV.

Cv.

See id. at 943.
See Scottsdale, 173 F.3d at 943.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 944
980 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. 1998).

STAT.

art. 4413(29bb), § 40(a) (1998) (repealed
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pollution exclusion did not exclude clean-up costs and granted summary
judgment for KCI on damages of $435,000.104 On appeal, however, the
court reversed and rendered judgment for Highlands, finding that the
policy excluded coverage for the clean-up costs. 10 5
The Texas Supreme Court considered whether the pollution exclusion
in the contractor's policy excluded coverage for the clean-up costs. In
one section of the policy, coverage was excluded for property damage
arising out of the discharge or release of pollutants "[a]t or from any
premises, site or location which is or was at any time owned or occupied
by, or rented or loaned to, any insured[.]" 10 6 Another section of the policy excluded coverage for any cost or expense arising out of a request that
the insured clean up, neutralize or in any way respond to the effects of
pollutants.t 0 7 The court noted that the case turned on whether or not the
10 8
phrase "occupied by" encompassed KCI's activities on the easement.
Highlands argued that "occupied by" meant "to take up space." KCI,
on the other hand, contended that something more than mere presence
was necessary. The court examined Tri County Service Co. v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co., 10 9 the only Texas case to address the issue. In Tri
County, the court found that the ordinary meaning of "occupied" did not
necessarily mean ownership and that the term was broad enough to include the insured's activities on a parking lot that the insured had been
subcontracted to pave. 110 The court also compared the Tri-County decision with United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. B & B Oil Well Service
Inc., 1' in which the court held that an oil well contractor was not an
occupier of the premises on which it had contracted to rework some
wells, and with Gregory v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., l 12 where the court
interpreted "occupy" as "to keep or hold for use." Ultimately, the KelleyCoppedge court held that the Tri-County interpretation of "occupy"
11 3
would render the second part of the pollution exclusion meaningless.
Instead, the court held that the first section of the pollution exclusion
refers to operations on premises owned or controlled by the contractor
14
and the second section refers to operations on a third party's premises.,
Thus, the court held that coverage for KCI's cleanup costs was
15
provided.
104. See id. at 463.
105. See id. at 463-64.
106. Id.
107. See id. Because Highlands failed to preserve error regarding this provision, the
court declined to decide whether this provision would have excluded coverage for KCI's
clean up costs. See id. at 467.
108. See id. at 464.
109. 873 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).
110. See id. at 721-22.
111. 910 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
112. 948 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1991).
113. See Kelley-Coppedge, Inc., 980 S.W.2d at 467.
114. See id.
115. See id.

1142

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

A lower court also considered a more recent version of the pollution
exclusion. In Mid-Continent Casualty v. United States Fire Insurance
Co., 1 16 the plaintiffs filed two lawsuits against Southbend Municipal Utility District (MUD) claiming that they were injured by drinking water
MUD furnished to them. MUD was insured by both Mid-Continent and
U.S. Fire. Mid-Continent provided a defense and successfully defended
MUD in both suits. U.S. Fire declined Mid-Continent's demand that U.S.
Fire participate in MUD's defense, citing the pollution exclusion in its
policy. Mid-Continent sued U.S. Fire for defense costs of the two suits
against MUD, but U.S. Fire ultimately obtained a summary judgment declaring that its pollution exclusion applied to the MUD suits.11 7
On appeal, the court rejected Mid-Continent's argument that the U.S.
Fire exclusion required pollutants to originate from a site owned or otherwise under the control of MUD."1 8 Instead, the court noted that the exclusion applied to the "discharge, disbursal, release or escape of
pollutants" from a site where MUD or those working on its behalf were
"performing operations."' 19 The underlying petition alleged that either
MUD or its contractor operated the facilities on behalf of MUD. 20 Additionally, the court noted that the polluted or contaminated drinking had
to have been "'discharged, disbursed, or released' from a site where
Southbend MUD or those working on its behalf were 'performing operations"' in order for MUD to provide the drinking water to the underlying
plaintiffs in the first place. 121 Therefore, the court held that the absolute
pollution exclusion applied, and upheld U.S. Fire's summary judgment. a22
In a recent environmental liability case, the insured, Gulf Metals, sold
materials for more than forty years to a chemical company in South Carolina that manufactured fertilizer, but did not know, or have any reason to
know, that its customer's fertilizer-manufacturing operations had serious
adverse environmental effects.' 23 Throughout the time of the sales, fertilizer-manufacturing operations were not believed to have serious environmental ramifications to neighboring property and groundwater.
However, the soil and groundwater at the site of the chemical company's
fertilizer plant were later determined to be contaminated. In 1994, the
EPA issued an administrative order requiring the insured to participate in
the cleanup of the site and to reimburse the EPA for existing cleanup
costs. South Carolina's state environmental agency issued a similar order
to Gulf Metals in 1997.
116. 1 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.).
117. See id. at 252.
118. See id. at 253.
119. Id. at 252. The reader should note that most pollution exclusions use the term
"disperse" over the term "disburse."
120. See id. at 253.
121. Id.
122. See id.

123. Gulf Metals Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 993 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex. App.Austin 1999, pet. denied).
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The insured sought coverage under a succession of liability policies it
purchased beginning in 1958. From 1970, most of the policies contained a
pollution exclusion that excluded coverage for "bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release; or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into
or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water" unless "such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
'124
accidental.
Gulf Metals sought a declaration that the limited pollution exclusion
did not preclude coverage for the environmental claims at the South Carolina fertilizer plant. The insured focused on the exception for "sudden
and accidental" discharges and argued that the word "sudden" could reasonably be interpreted to mean "unexpected." Under this reading, the
"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion would reinstate coverage as long as the underlying event was unexpected and unintended from the standpoint of the insured. Chicago Insurance moved for
summary judgment, responding that "sudden" necessarily contains a temporal element requiring that any discharge of pollutants be swift or abrupt for the exception to the exclusion to apply.
The district court held that (1) the insured had the burden of proving
that the facts of its polluting events fell within the "sudden and accidental" exception of the pollution exclusion; (2) there was neither patent nor
latent ambiguity in the phase "sudden and accidental;" (3) that the term
"sudden," as used in the policy, contained a temporal element; and (4)
1 25
that the phrase "sudden and accidental" meant "rapid and unexpected.
Concluding that the insured could not meet its burden of proving that the
pollution exclusion did not bar coverage, the district court granted the
126
insurer's motion for partial summary judgment.
In affirming, the court of appeals emphatically rejected Gulf Metals'
contention that the pollution exclusion was patently ambiguous. 127 The
insured had relied on dictionary definitions of "sudden" and the diversity
of judicial opinion on the meaning of the pollution exclusion as evidence
of the exclusion's patent ambiguity. 128 The court refused to give weight
to either form of evidence, noting that both unduly restrict the ability of
1 29
courts to engage in "meaningful contextual analysis of contract terms."'
Interpreting the word "sudden" in the context of the policy, "[t]he court
reasoned that the use of both words together reflected two separate requirements. Because 'accidental' describes an unforeseen or unexpected
event," the court observed, to ascribe the same meaning to "sudden"
would render the terms redundant and "violate the rule that each word in
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 803.
Id. at 803-04.
See id. at 804.
See id. at 805.
See id. at 805-06.
Id. at 807.
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a contract be given effect. ' 130 "The court stated that 'sudden' therefore
' 1 31
must contain a temporal element meaning abrupt or brief.'
The court also found nothing in the circumstances surrounding promulgation of the policies' pollution exclusion that demonstrated a latent ambiguity in the exclusion. 132 The only evidence proffered by the insured
related to the Texas State Board of Insurance's understanding of the exclusion. Although acknowledging that "surrounding circumstances" may
be considered in determining whether an insurance policy is ambiguous,
the court held that the relevant circumstances are those surrounding the
making of the contract, not those present when a regulatory body ap133
proves or promulgates a policy form.
E. ADVERTISING INJURY
The central issue in Bay Electric134 concerned whether claims of trademark infringement and trade dress infringement constitute an "advertising injury" under Texas law. An underlying action by a competitor, ACB,
claimed that Bay Electric and FAE sold circuit breakers bearing trademarks and configurations allegedly identified with and owned by ACB.
Travelers carried general liability insurance covering Bay Electric from
April 1995 to April 1998. FAE was added as a named insured to the
coverage in September 1995. ACB sued in July 1997, and the insureds'
broker notified Travelers of the suit in December 1997.
The court held that the claims of trademark and trade dress infringement constituted the "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business," one of the elements of the policy's "advertising injury"
definition. 135 The court rejected the Sixth Circuit's and Travelers' argument that the clause indicating that "misappropriation of advertising
ideas or style of doing business" refers only to offenses falling under the
common law tort of misappropriation.136 The court noted that if the
drafters of the policy had wanted to limit exposure this common law tort,
they could have done so. 137 Interestingly, the court then stated:
Further, under Texas law, the Court is to look to the understanding
of the average insured, and the Court does not believe that the average insured is required to know the obscure distinctions between
common law business torts; instead the burden to identify such distinctions and incorporate them into the policy should fall upon the
130. Id. at 805.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 808.
133. See id.
134. See Bay Elec. Supply Inc. v. The Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 611 (S.D.
Tex. 1999).
135. Id. at 616.

136. Il.
at 617.
137. See id. at 617 (citing Industrial Molding Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 17
F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Union Ins. Co. v. Knife, 897 F. Supp. 1213, 1216
(W.D. Ark. 1995)).
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insurer.138

After observing that there is disagreement on the meaning of the
phrases "advertising ideas" and "style of doing business," the court noted
these phrases were ambiguous. 139 Because the insured proposed an objectively reasonable interpretation of the policy language that had been
accepted by courts in other jurisdictions, the court adopted the insureds'
0
construction of the terms.t4
The court found further support for its conclusion in the drafting history of the standard ISO CGL form. In 1986 the standard CGL form was
revised to eliminate "unfair competition" as a covered class of advertising
injuries in favor of the misappropriation of advertising ideas and style of
doing business, and also removed the trademark, service mark and trade
name exclusions from the policy; thus the court held that an insured
"could reasonably infer that claims related to trade dress would not be
excluded from the CGL policy.

'141

The court rejected Travelers' argument that no advertising injury occurred because the insureds' marketing consisted primarily of mailing or
faxing price sheets to customers. 142 Looking solely to the underlying
ACB complaint, the court found that Bay Electric and FAE had successfully shown that allegations of the complaint alleged an advertising injury. 143 Travelers' attempted application of the knowledge of falsity
exclusion because it failed to carry its burden of proof on the knowledge
element of the exclusion. 144 As the court pointed out, "knowledge is not
a requirement for a finding of liability in the underlying action ...

[t]he

conduct alleged by ACB could have been found to be merely negligent or
'145
reckless.
The prior publication exclusion was also found inapplicable by the
court. Although the inception of sales of the allegedly infringing circuit
breakers occurred in August 1995, when FAE (arguably the real party in
interest) was not covered under the policy, the court determined that
ACB's cause of action against Bay Electric and FAE did not arise until
ACB registered its trademarks in 1997.146
138. Id. The court cites no authority for this proposition, and so it is difficult to determine if the court is using a form of the "reasonable expectations" doctrine. Texas generally
does not adhere to such a doctrine, but has acknowledged it in limited circumstances. See,
e.g., Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986)
(permitting innocent victim whose property has been destroyed to collect under insurance
policy for loss "reasonably expected" to be covered).
139. See id. at 617.
140. Id. (citing American States Ins. Co. of Texas v. Arnold, 930 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex.
App. - Dallas 1996, writ denied); Nationwide Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McFarland, 887
S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied)).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 618.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 617-18.
145. Id. at 619.
146. See id.
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Finally, the court rejected Travelers' late notice defense. Travelers
claimed that although Bay Electric and FAE knew of the ACB suit in July
1997 they did not notify Travelers until December 1997. Since Travelers'
denial of coverage was not originally based on late notice, Travelers
would have denied coverage regardless of the timing of the notice. 47 As
a result, the court found that Travelers was not prejudiced by the un48
timely notice. 1
F.

ADDITIONAL INSURED

In Admiral Insurance Co. v. Trident NGL, Inc., 149 Santos, an employee
of K-D Oilfield Services ("KD"), was assigned by KD to assist Trident in
performing preventive maintenance on a compressor. Santos was unloading Trident's tools from Trident's truck when the compressor exploded, seriously injuring Santos. It was undisputed that neither Santos
nor anyone employed by KD performed any act that caused the compressor to explode. Trident and KD had previously entered into an agreement for KD to service facilities owned by Trident, under which KD was
required to purchase CGL insurance and to include Trident as an additional insured. The additional insured endorsement added Trident "but
only with respect to liability arising out of the named insured's [KD's]
operations."' 150 The endorsement defined operations as "oil or gas well
servicing ... to include materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith."' 5 1 Admiral maintained that, absent an affirmative
act by KD that caused or contributed to the explosion, the additional
insured endorsement in the policy did not provide coverage. The court
flatly rejected Admiral's position, based on the majority position that if
the accident is directly related to the contractor's work, then the additional insured clause is satisfied and the policy extends coverage to the
additional insured. 152 The court held that, because the accident occurred
to a KD employee while the employee was on the premises for the purpose of performing preventive maintenance on the compressor that exploded, the alleged liability arose out of KD's operations and, therefore,
was covered by the additional insured provision. 53

147. See id. at 620.
148. See id.
149. 988 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).

150. Id. at 454.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 454-55 (citing Merchants Ins. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 143
F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1998); McIntosh v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1993); Saavedra v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 930 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1991). For a discussion of these
cases, see Douglas R. Richmond, The Additional Problems of Additional Insureds, 33
TORT & INS. L.J. 945, 956-65 (1998).

153. Id. at 455.
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INNOCENT SPOUSE'S RECOVERY OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS

In Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. Murphy,' 54 the court found that an
innocent spouse may recover insurance proceeds when the other co-insured spouse intentionally destroyed the covered community property.
One week before Robert and Daisy Murphy's house burned to the
ground, Robert obtained a binder on a standard homeowners policy with
Texas Farmers covering both the home and its contents. Texas Farmers
concluded after its fire investigation that Robert intentionally caused the
fire. The carrier filed suit seeking a declaration of nonliability under the
policy, based on a public policy prohibition against arsonists recovering
their losses. Robert counterclaimed for breach of contract and insurance
code violations and Daisy subsequently intervened with her own claim
for policy benefits.
Although the Texas Supreme Court had previously held that the illegal
destruction of jointly-held property by one co-insured does not bar recovery under an insurance policy by an innocent co-insured, the court
explicitly declined to decide whether the principle extended to community property. 155 Noting that many decisions from other jurisdictions
were based on public policy, the court stated that contractual interpretation was actually the first step in insurance analysis. 156 Even though the
Texas Farmers policy contained a condition barring coverage for all insureds if any one of them commits a fraud or intentionally conceals or
misrepresents a material fact, the court found that since Texas Farmers
failed to obtain a jury finding on the condition, it could not be used as a
157
defense to coverage.
In a discussion of the public policy implications of its decision, the
court noted that in order to prevent an arsonist from having a community
interest in any recovery, Texas courts generally have "conditioned an innocent spouse's recovery on whether and when the community interests
in the insurance policy have been severed. 1 58 The court stated that it
was unfair to require an innocent spouse to obtain a partition or divorce
before the claim was filed or denied because its assumes that partition
can be obtained before the insurer denies the claim.1 59 The court also
expressed dissatisfaction with such a rule because it encourages an innocent spouse to "hastily partition or divorce, even though a jury may later
acquit the suspected spouse of any alleged wrongdoing. '160 The court
reaffirmed the public policy forbidding an arsonist from benefitting from
154. 996 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1999).
155. See Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955
(Tex. 1986) (permitting innocent victim whose property has been destroyed to collect
under insurance policy for loss "reasonably expected" to be covered).
156. See Murphy, 996 S.W.2d at 875.
157. See id. at 879-80.
158. Id. at 880 n.45.
159. See id. at 881.
160. Id. at 881.
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his fraud by denying recovery of the arsonist's own one-half interest in
the claim against the insurer. 161 But the court held that public policy did
not trump the innocent spouse's contractual right to recover his or her
162
one-half interest in the policy benefits.
B.

FOUNDATION CLAIMS

Withrow v. State Farm Lloyds 163 involved a claim for foundation damage against both the builder of the residence and the homeowner's insurer. Withrow, the homeowner, sued the builder of her house and
engineering consultants for alleged negligence in failing to inspect the
soil, failing to properly design the foundation, and failing to properly
build the foundation. When the home subsequently suffered substantial
damage due to the movement of soil below the foundation, Withrow sued
State Farm for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, negligence, and not fully honoring her claim for foundation
damage. State Farm obtained a summary judgment from the trial court
based on exclusions in the policy. Based upon the allegations in
Withrow's pleadings, the court of appeals held the "inherent vice exclusion" 164 precluded coverage for the foundation claim. 165 The court also
held the "foundation exclusion"' 66 applied. 167 Based upon this policy
language, the court concluded State Farm was entitled to summary judg168
ment on plaintiff's breach of contract and bad faith causes of action.
IV. LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE
In Vega v. National Life Insurance Services, Inc.,169 the Vegas were the
sole owners of a corporation which sponsored an employee group medical plan. The plan was administered by a subsidiary of the insurer that
issued the policy. The husband was enrolled in the health plan as an employee and the wife was enrolled as a dependent of her husband. In filling out the application for his wife, the husband stated that his wife had
not received any advice or consultation for any medical condition during
the preceding six-month period; but the plan administrator discovered a
notation in the wife's earlier medical records which referred to posterior
repair. The administrator called the wife's doctor and was informed that
the wife had earlier asked the doctor about the surgical procedure. The
administrator subsequently denied the claim on the basis that the hus161. See id.

162. See id.
163. 990 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, writ denied).

164. The exclusion excluded coverage caused by "wear and tear, deterioration or loss
caused by any quality in the property that causes it to damage or destroy itself." Id. at 437.
165. See id.
166. The exclusion precludes coverage for any loss "caused by settling, cracking, bulging, shrinkage, or expansion of foundations ....
Id. at 437.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. 188 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 1999).
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band and wife failed to accurately answer the question about the wife's
prior medical history.
Instead of pursuing an administrative appeal, the wife retained an attorney who sued the insurer in state court. The insurer removed the case
to federal court, asserting that the case was governed by ERISA. The
district court granted summary judgment for the insurer, concluding that
National Life had not abused its discretion in denying the claim and that
ERISA applied. 170 The court also ruled that the wife was not permitted
to present as evidence her doctor's testimony that the surgery was not
contemplated before she was enrolled in the plan because that evidence
was not available to the plan administrator. 171
On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit ruled that because a conflict of
interest existed between the interests of the wife and those of the plan
administrator, the administrator had a duty to conduct a reasonable,
good-faith investigation of the claim. 17 2 In determining whether that
173
duty had been met, it was proper to consider the doctor's testimony.
Relying heavily on that evidence, the panel concluded that the insurer
violated its duty to conduct a reasonable, good-faith investigation of the
174
claim.
The en banc Fifth Circuit, however, disapproved the panel's decision. 17 5 The court found that ERISA controlled the suit because the husband could properly be characterized as an employee of the corporation
176
he co-owned with his wife.
The court then set about to determine the standard to which an administrator of an ERISA plan will be held when reviewing the denial of benefits. 177 The court noted the existence of a conflict of interest between Pan

American, the insurer, and National Life, the administrator and a subsidiary of Pan American. 78 Acknowledging the varying results among the
other circuit courts faced with the issue, the Fifth Circuit ultimately
adopted the "sliding scale" standard under which the court applies an
abuse of discretion standard, but gives less deference to the administrator
in proportion to the administrator's apparent conflict. 79 The court then
held that "when confronted with a denial of benefits by a conflicted administrator, the district court may not impose a duty to reasonably investigate on the administrator.'

180

Finally, the court determined that the administrative record in the case
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See id. at 288.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Vega, 188 F.3d at 302.
See id. at 294.
See id.
See id. at 295.
See id. at 296.
Id. at 299.
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contained no evidence that would support denying the claim. 18 1 As a result, the court reversed and rendered on the finding of no liability and
remanded the proceeding to the district court for a determination of
damages. 182
In Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Mizell,183 Mizell's major medical policy
provided health benefits only for a condition which "first manifests itself
more than thirty days" after the inception of the policy. 184 Thirty-one
days after the effective date of the policy, Mizell was examined by a physician with complaints of a knot in the muscle of his right arm. Mizell
admitted to his physician that he had first noticed the swollen condition
three days earlier. The knot was subsequently determined to be a form of
cancer. Benefit Life denied coverage for the subsequent cancer treatment because of its belief that the condition had manifested itself within
the thirty days of the effective date of the policy. Mizell disagreed because the medical diagnosis did not take place until after thirty days following the issuance of the policy.
On appeal, the court focused on the manifestation of the actual illness,
in contrast to the manifestation of symptoms or conditions leading Mizell
to seek an ultimate diagnosis. The court held that the verb "manifest" in
the policy requires that the information available for diagnosis be restricted to what the physician could "readily perceive by the senses especially by the sight" and similarly "what is apparent, obvious or plain" to
the doctor. 18 5 The court held that the results of invasive surgery of a
patient are not "apparent, obvious, or plain" or from what the diagnosing
physician sees. 186 Because the cancer did not manifest within thirty days
of the effective date of the subject policy, the court determined that pol87
icy covered the cancer.
V. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
A.

UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST

1. Recovery of PIP Benefits
In two cases consolidated for oral argument, the Texas Supreme Court
held valid and enforceable a provision barring duplication of uninsured/
underinsured (UM/UIM) and personal injury protection (PIP) benefits
that would result in a double recovery for the insured. In Mid-Century
Insurance Co. of Texas v. Kidd,188 while driving his own car, Kidd was
involved in an accident with an uninsured driver who was at fault for
Kidd's property damage and serious personal injuries. The policy issued
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See Vega, 188 F.3d at 300.
See id. at 302.
2 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, pet. denied).
Id. at 424.
Id. at 427.
See id.
See id.
997 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1999).
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by Mid-Century to Kidd contained UM limits of $100,000 and PIP coverage of $10,000. Mid-Century paid Kidd the $10,000 PIP benefits. A jury
later determined that Kidd had $13,000 in past medical expenses from the
accident. Mid-Century moved for an offset against the $10,000 for PIP
benefits already paid. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected Mid-Century's request for an offset because Kidd was the owner
and operator of the car. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gerlich, 189 Gerlich was driving her vehicle when she was hit by an uninsured
motorist. Gerlich's Nationwide policy included both PIP and UM coverage and contained a contractual offset in the UM coverage. Nationwide
initially paid Gerlich $2,200 in PIP benefits. After later settling her UM
claim for $3,500, Nationwide claimed it was entitled to a credit for the
PIP benefits it had previously paid to Gerlich and issued a check to for
$1,300 for the UM settlement. The appellate court held that Nationwide
had the burden of proving that without the offset, Gerlich would obtain a
double recovery. 190 The parties had stipulated that the UM settlement
was $3,500, but did not stipulate that Gerlich's actual damages were
$3,500. The court of appeals seized upon this distinction in holding that
191
Nationwide was not entitled to an offset.
The Texas Supreme Court noted that in previous cases it had held UM/
UIM offsets invalid to the extent that such offsets prevented the recovery
of actual damages or reduced UM protection below the minimum limits
required by statute. 192 But nothing in the previous holdings, the court
explained, rendered the offsets ineffective if they prevented only excess
recoveries. 193 The language of the offset expressed in its preamble the
intent to withhold only "payments in excess of actual damages sustained."1 94 The operative language of the offset stated that the carrier
was only liable for "covered damages." The offset, by its terms, was also
subject to the policy limits. The court rejected arguments by the insureds
that the UM and PIP statutes' silence on recovery in excess of actual
damages permitted a double recovery. 195 Specifically, the court held that
it could not read an intent in the statutory offset provisions to favor
double recoveries in situations where they were not expressly excluded. 196 The court also held that the insureds' payment of separate premiums for the UM/UIM and PIP coverages did not entitle them to
double benefits; instead, this was a matter for rate adjustment by the
197
Texas Department of Insurance.
189. 997 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1999).
190. See id. at 268.
191. See id. at 267.
192. See id. at 269-70 (citing American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.
1972); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 514 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. 1974); Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1974)).
193. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d at 270.
194. Id. at 271.
195. See id. at 270.
196. See id. at 271.
197. Id. at 275.
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Use of the Auto

The Texas Supreme Court recently evaluated the availability of UM
98
motorist benefits to cover damages arising out of a drive-by shooting.
In order to trigger UM benefits, the liability of the uninsured driver
"must arise, out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured
motor vehicle."' 199 The Court agreed with State Farm's interpretation that
this language was intended to protect against auto accidents, "not against
criminal nor intentional acts that have a mere incidental relationship to
the vehicle. '200 The Court found the shooting to be an independent and
intentional act which is not covered under the UM policy because the
"use" of the vehicle was "incidental to the shooting. ' 20 1
In contrast, the majority in Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas v.
Lindsey20 2 found a nine-year old boy's accidental discharge of a shotgun
while entering the cab of a pickup truck (through the truck's sliding rear
window) constituted an "accident" which arose out of the "use" of the
vehicle thus entitling the injured insured to UIM benefits. 20 3 With minimal analysis, the majority came to the conclusions that the child's accidental discharge of the shotgun while entering the truck was an "auto
accident" even though there was no collision between vehicles. 20 4 The
majority also found that entering a locked pickup truck from a sliding
rear window did involve the "use" of the vehicle, even though such a
20 5
method of entry was very unorthodox.
The dissent in Lindsey found the majority's decision completely inconsistent with a prior decision by the court in National Union FireInsurance
Co. v. Merchant's Fast Motor Lines,20 6 in which the court held that the
negligent discharge of a fire arm does not produce an injury caused by the
"use" of a covered auto. 2°7 The dissent compared the facts in this case
and the facts in Merchant's and found them. to be virtually identical. 20 8
Both cases involved the negligent discharge of a firearm from a vehicle,
both injuries were incidental to the use of the vehicle, and both claims
lacked a causal nexus between the vehicles and the accident.
3.

Prejudgment Interest

The Amarillo Court of Appeals held a claimant seeking UIM benefits
who prevailed at trial was not entitled to prejudgment interest. 20 9 The
198. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 988 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1999).
199. Id. at 745 (quoting State Farm Insurance Policy).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 997 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1999).
203. Id. at 164.
204. Id. at 154-55.
205. Id.
206. 939 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1997).
207. Id. at 1.39.
208. See Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d at 164-65.
209. Henson v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1999, pet. pending).
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court noted that a UIM claimant is required by the policy to show that he
is "legally entitled to recover" from the underinsured tortfeasor before
the UIM carrier owes any policy benefits. 210 The insured must also establish his legal entitlement to recover against the tortfeasor as a condition
precedent to the recovery of UIM benefits. 21' This condition precedent is
21 2
satisfied when the insurer acknowledges coverage and compensability.
If the UIM insurer does not believe the claim is compensable, UIM coverage is triggered when a factfinder judicially determines liability and
damages. 213 The court found that neither the filing of the UIM claim
with the carrier nor the insured's repeated demands for policy benefits
satisfied the conditions precedent. 214 Because the UIM insurer timely
paid the UIM benefits immediately following the jury verdict, the court
decided that the insured had not lost the use of money which the insured
was entitled to receive. 215 As such, pre-judgment interest was not
available. 216
4.

Competing UIM Claims

The Texarkana Court of Appeals held a UIM carrier was not subject to
contractual or extracontractual damages because it paid partial UIM benefits to one insured even though it decreased the available UIM benefits
available to another UIM insured. 217 This case arose out of physical injuries received by a minor and the subsequent UIM claims advanced by his
divorced parents. State Farm offered to split the $20,000 UIM benefits
equally between the divorced parents. The father accepted. After discovering that some of the UIM benefits had been depleted, the mother
sued State Farm.
Relying upon Soriano,21 8 the court held that a UIM carrier could not
face contractual or extracontractual liability for settling reasonable claims
with one of several claimants even though such a settlement reduced or
21 9
exhausted the policy proceeds available to any remaining claimants.
Because the court found State Farm's tender of some of the UIM benefits
to the father was reasonable, it affirmed State Farm's summary judgment
on the contract and bad faith causes of action, but remanded because of
the existence of fact issues regarding the PIP claims and misrepresentation claims under article 21.21.220
210. See id. at 839.
211. See id. at 840.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See Henson, 989 S.W.2d at 840.
216. See id.
217. Lane v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 992 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-Texarkana,
1999, no pet.).
218. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994).
219. See Lane, 992 S.W.2d at 553.
220. See id. at 554.
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21.55

In Dunn v. Southern Farm Bureau Casually Insurance Co., 22 1 following
an automobile accident, Dunn submitted a claim for PIP benefits, which
Southern Farm handled in compliance with article 21.55. As the PIP
claim was pending, Dunn also made a claim for UM benefits. The PIP
benefits were timely paid. When the parties could not reach an agreement on the value of the UM claim, Dunn sued for policy benefits and
article 21.55 damages in the amount of eighteen percent. Dunn won at
trial but did not receive the eighteen percent penalty or attorney fees
provided under article 21.55.
On appeal, the court held the requirements of article 21.55 applied separately to Dunn's UIM claim and to her PIP claim. 222 Even though an
insurer complies with the statute in handling one claim, a related but separate claim still must comply with article 21.55.223 The court also rejected
Southern Farm's argument that the statute should not apply to UM
claims because coverage for UIM benefits is not readily ascertainable until a jury determines that the claimant is entitled to recover damages from
the uninsured tortfeasor. 224 Southern Farm argued its contractual liability did not materialize until the tortfeasor's liability and the claimant's
actual damages were ascertained. The court disagreed because the statute requires'225
certain activities in the handling of a claim must be done
"promptly.
The court concluded that the insured was entitled to an
eighteen percent penalty on the contractual damages
found at trial plus
226
pre-judgment interest on the contractual damages.
VI. AGENCY
In Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Castee/227 the court addressed whether
an independent insurance agent had standing to sue an insurer under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. Casteel was an independent agent of
Crown Life who sold modified vanishing premium policies. One of the
policies sold by Casteel led to a lawsuit by policyholders against Casteel
and Crown Life. In that lawsuit, Casteel filed a cross-claim against
Crown Life. On appeal, Crown Life sought to determine whether Casteel, who alleged that he was injured by the unfair and deceptive practices
of Crown Life, had standing to sue Crown Life under Insurance Code
article 21.21; and whether that standing extends to article 21.21 claims
that allow recovery for DTPA violations.
221. 991 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Tyler, 1999, pet. pending).
222. See id. at 467.
223. See id. at 472.
224. See id. at 474.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 478.
227. 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 945 (July 1, 1999), opinion withdrawn (Jan. 27, 2000); Substituted Opinion on Grant of Rehearing in Part, 43 Tex. Sup. J. 348 (Jan. 27, 2000).
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Initially, the court considered whether Casteel, as an insurance agent,
was a person with standing to sue Crown Life under article 21.21, and
whether Casteel must also be a consumer to have standing to recover
under article 21.21's incorporated DTPA violations. The court observed
that it was consistent with the legislature's express objective to regulate
all insurance trade practices to conclude that an insurance agent is a person with standing to sue an insurance company when the agent is damaged by company practices that violate article 21.21.228 Not permitting
such standing, stated the court, "would allow an insurer to deceive its
agent with impunity, despite knowing that the misinformation would
22z9
eventually reach the public.
An insurance agent is a person as defined under article 21.21, §2(a), for
purposes of determining standing under article 21.21, §16(a). 2 30 Thus,
when an agent meets the other required elements for a cause of action
under Art. 21.21, §16(a), sustaining actual damages caused by another's
engaging in an act or practice declared unfair or deceptive, the agent has
standing to bring that claim.
Only a consumer can maintain a cause of action directly under the
DTPA. A consumer is defined as one who seeks or acquires by purchase
or lease, any goods or services.2 31 Although Casteel admitted that he was
not a consumer, he argued that consumer status is not required of him
because his DTPA-based causes of action arose through article 21.21, not
the DTPA itself. "While article 21.21 incorporates the DTPA232
laundry list
of deceptive acts, it does not incorporate the entire DTPA."
Casteel's claims arose from Crown Life's alleged misrepresentations of
policy illustrations prepared by Crown Life and presented by Casteel to
his clients. The court pointed out that Casteel did not acquire or seek to
acquire the policies; he was merely the conduit for information. The misinformation at issue did not concern goods or services purchased or
leased by Casteel. 233 Instead, Crown Life's alleged misrepresentations to
Casteel involved internal product information for Casteel's use in the
sales of policies. 234 The court held that because Casteel was not a consumer of Crown Life's goods and services, he could not state a cause of
action under article 21.21 for DTPA violations which require consumer
235
status.
Thus, the court found Casteel was a person with standing to sue Crown
Life for violations of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, but he did not
have standing to sue Crown Life for violations of those DTPA provisions
228.
229.
230.
231.
2000)).
232.
233.
234.
235.

See
See
See
See

Casteel, 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 4.
id.
id. at 6.
id. (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE

Id.
See id. at 7.
See Casteel, 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 7.
See id.

ANN.

§ 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987 & Supp.

1.156
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incorporated within article 21.21 that, by their terms, required Casteel to
be a consumer.2 36 The court also determined that Crown Life was entitled
to summary judgment on Casteel's common-law claims. 237 The court reversed and rendered the court of appeals' judgment in favor of Casteel on
his article 21.21 claims for DTPA violations. 238 The court reversed and
remanded Casteel's other article 21.21 claims to the trial court for proceedings consistent with its opinion.2 39
VII.
A.

MISCELLANEOUS
FRAUDULENT JOINDER

In Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 240 the Fifth Circuit comprehensively
analyzed fraudulent joinder contentions arising in the context of a breach
of contract and bad faith claim brought against State Farm and its agent,
Blum, through whom the homeowner's policy had been secured. Griggs,
the insured under the homeowners' policy, claimed an insured loss in excess of $1 million from burglaries of sports memorabilia. Ultimately,
State Farm provided Griggs with notice that it was denying his claim
based on a failure to comply with his contractual duties to provide a
sworn proof of loss, to produce an accurate and itemized inventory of the
items stolen, and to permit reasonable access to records and documentation in support of his claim.
Griggs filed suit against State Farm Lloyds and Blum in Texas state
court. State Farm Lloyds removed the case alleging diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and the fraudulent joinder of Blum. Blum and Griggs
were both Texas citizens. The federal district court found that Blum was
fraudulent joined, entered an order dismissing Blum, and denied Griggs'
motion to remand.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to remand after an
extended review of Texas law on claims against insurance agents. Griggs'
original and amended petitions named Blum as a defendant but did not
allege any actionable facts specific to Blum. Blum was never served. The
court noted that both Griggs' "factual allegations and his articulation of
the legal claims focused solely upon State Farm Lloyds' conduct in the
processing and ultimate denial of this claim. '24 1 The Fifth Circuit also
noted that it was undisputed that Blum had no claims processing responsibility and no decision-making authority with respect to the processing of
Griggs' claim or with respect to State Farm Lloyd's ultimate denial of
Griggs' claim. 24 2 Accordingly, there was no basis for Griggs' claim alleg236. See id.
237. See id. at 10.

238. See id. at 12.
239. See id.
240. 181 F.3d 694 (5th Cir. 1999).

241. Id. at 699.
242. See id.
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ing that Blum breached the insurance contract. 243 Furthermore, the court
observed that Griggs had not alleged that his relationship with Blum was
"governed or created by" any contract, or that his relationship with Blum
was otherwise imbued with special characteristics that would give rise to
the "special relationship" required to impose a duty of good faith and fair
claim against
dealing. 244 Accordingly, there was no basis for Griggs'
2 45
dealing.
fair
and
faith
good
of
duty
of
Blum for breach
Finally, the court commented that Texas courts have recently recognized that the statutory language of the Insurance Code is broad enough
an
to permit in the appropriate circumstances a cause of action against 246
insurance agent who engages in unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
Blum's pre-purchase statements that State Farm Lloyds would handle
Griggs' claim professionally, as well as her post-claim assurances that she
would monitor the progress of Griggs' claim, were determined by the
court to be more in the nature of puffery than actual representations of
specific material fact. The court held that Blum's general, undocumented
and non-specific statements fell short of actual representations under
Texas law. 247 In addition, Griggs' Insurance Code and DTPA claims

failed because there is no conceivable basis in law or fact upon which
as actual representaBlum's non-specific statements can be construed
2 48
Griggs.
by
alleged
injury
the
caused
that
tions
B.

UNAPPROVED POLICIES

In Urrutia v. Decker,249 Penske, a truck leasing company, had a commercial business auto policy that provided $1 million of liability protection. The policy's definition of "insured" included "[b]oth lessees and
rentees of covered autos ...

but only to the extent and for the limits of

liability agreed to under contractual agreement with the named insured. '250 Urrutia leased a truck from Penske, which agreed to provide
liability protection to Urrutia limited to the minimum coverage required
by the state's financial responsibility law.25 1 Urrutia was subsequently

involved in an accident while operating the leased truck. The driver of
the other vehicle, Decker, was seriously injured, but agreed to settle his
claims against Urrutia and Penske for $20,000, the amount of liability
protection provided to Urrutia under the lease terms and the amount that
Decker assumed was the only insurance available.
243. See id. at 700.
244. Id. at 701.
245. See id. at 702.
246. See Griggs, 181 F.3d at 701 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors,
Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1998)).

247. See id.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See id. at 702.
992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1999).
Id. at 441.
See id. at 442; see also TEX.

TRANSP. CODE ANN.

§ 601.072 (Vernon 1999).
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When Decker learned of Penske's $1 million policy, he sought to reopen his personal-injury suit against Urrutia and Penske. The defendants
moved for, and the trial court granted, summary judgment on the ground
that Decker had signed the settlement and released his claims. On appeal, however, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that the parties had made a mutual mistake of fact by reading the rental agreement to
limit coverage to $20,000.252
Upon review, the Supreme Court found under the terms of the policy,
the liability limit in this case was $20,000.253 The court noted that the
terms of the rental agreement were sufficiently written into the terms of
the policy covering Penske. 254 It disagreed with the court of appeals'
holding that the rental contract was void as an endorsement because it
was not in a form approved by the State Board of Insurance.2 55 While
the court agreed that the rental agreement did not have board approval
for use as an insurance contract, it observed that the terms of the rental
agreement did not conflict with the approved standard form or the terms
of the commercial business auto policy. 256 Furthermore, to void the provisions in the rental agreement because it was not in an approved form,
2 57
the court held, would leave an innocent insured without protection.
The court held, "[b]ecause insurance sold through an unapproved policy
is voidable, the insured may, upon learning that the insurance is unapproved, elect to rescind it. If the insured elects to accept the insurance,
'258
however, he must do so under the agreed terms.
The court held that Urrutia accepted the terms of the rental agreement
insurance and, therefore, the court of appeals erred in voiding those insurance provisions in the rental agreement merely because they were not
in a form prescribed by the board.2 59 The liability insurance sold by Penske to Urrutia was merely voidable, not void, the court observed, and
limited the liability protection extended to Urrutia to the $20,000 recov2 60
ered by Decker.
In Republic Western Insurance Co. v. State,261 U-Haul of Texas offered
its customers "Safe Protection" insurance packages for the rental of mov252. See Urrutia,992 S.W.2d at 442.
253. See id. at 444.
254. See id. at 443.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. Urrutia, 992 S.W.2d at 443-44 (citing Imperial Premium Fin., Inc. v. Khoury, 129
F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1997) (insured cannot select the good and discard the bad); Hertz
Corp. v. Pap, 923 F. Supp. 914, 922 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (insured cannot chose to void unfavorable language and retain remainder of unapproved policy), affd, 98 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir.
1996); McLaren v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 767 F. Supp. 1364, 1376 (N.D. Tex. 1991)
(insured must take or leave the policy in its entirety), affd, 968 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 915; cf Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d
255, 257 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when policy has board approval but
conflicting endorsement does not, insurer cannot enforce endorsement)).
259. See Urrutia,992 S.W.2d at 444.
260. See id.
261. 985 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
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ing equipment, towing equipment, and storage spaces. "Safestor," the
storage insurance package, provided additional protection against various
dangers posed to items while stored in U-Haul storage facilities. U-Haul
had coverage with Republic Western, which permitted U-Haul to add its
customers to its own policy as additional insureds. Any premium paid by
the customer went directly to Republic Western. After an investigation
by and subsequent settlement efforts with the Texas Department of Insurance, U-Haul filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration from the court that its activities did violate the Insurance Code. The
trial court ultimately held that U-Haul of Texas, U-Haul International
and Republic Western were all engaged in the unauthorized business of
insurance in violation of Insurance Code article 1.14-1.262 The trial court
further determined that U-Haul was acting as an unlicenced local recording agent for Republic Western in violation of Insurance Code article
21.14.263

In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals held that
since U-Haul did not dispute that U-Haul was not statutorily authorized
to engage in the insurance business, U-Haul's conduct violated the plain
meaning of the terms in article 1.14-1 that define "doing an insurance
business. '264 The court distinguished an offer to procure insurance from
U-Haul's activities. Specifically, U-Haul's customers entered into a contract with and paid a premium to U-Haul in exchange for the benefit of
being insured under its policy with Republic Western. The court, in determining that U-Haul was a local recording agent for Republic Western
under article 21.14, decided that while binding Republic Western to insurance risks on its rental customers might not be its primary business, the
265
statute does not require any specific proportion of insurance activity.
The court specifically observed:
The evidence in the record establishes that UHI receives the premium on the insurance packages sold by U-Haul and then remits the
funds to Republic Western, its sibling corporation .... In so doing,

UHI violates article 1.14-1 by assisting U-Haul in the solicitation,
procurement and effectuation of insurance; in the dissemination of
as to coverage and rates; and in the delivery of insurance
information
266
contracts.
The court also held that Republic Western, the insurer actually issuing
the master policy, was also in violation of the Insurance Code even
though it was a licensed insurer. 267 Republic Western violated of article
1.14-1 section 6268 by issuing master policies designed to provide addi262. See id. at 700; see also TEX.

INS. CODE ANN.

art. 1.14-1 (Vernon 1981) (subse-

quently was recodified as art. 101.051).
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
2000).

See Republic Western, 985 S.W.2d at 700.
Id. at 702.
See id.
Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN art. 1.14-1, § 2(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
See id.
Currently, TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-1, § 101.051(6) (Vernon 1981 & Supp.
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tional insured protection to U-Haul's rental customers, for which it received premium payments from U-Haul through UHI. 269 The court
specifically focused on the fact that the U-Haul customers, who were to
be additional insureds under master policies, entered into a contract with
U-Haul and paid a premium to U-Haul in exchange for the benefit of
2 70
being insured under U-Haul's master policies with Republic Western.
VIII. STATUTORY CHANGES
The Texas Legislature also enacted various revisions to the Texas Insurance Code during the Texas Survey period. Statutory provisions regulating viatical settlements 271 were amended to include life settlements. 272
Persons who engage in this business are required to register with the
Texas Insurance Commission.2 73 The insurance commissioner shall adopt
rules governing the registration of individuals who engage in the business
of life settlements, as well as viatical settlements, and to approve the contract forms they use in order to prevent unfair discrimination.2 74 If the
insurance commissioner finds that a licensed individual has willfully violated these provisions of the Insurance Code or any rules or regulations
dealing with viatical or life settlements, the commissioner may suspend or
revoke the license of the individual. 275
Article 3.77, regulating the Texas Health Insurance Risk Pool, was
amended to make it easier for individuals to obtain insurance through the
Pool.276 An individual now need only provide to the pool evidence of
rejection or refusal to issue a health insurance policy by one insurer,
rather than the two previously required.2 77 The individual may also obtain a certificate (on a form to be developed by the Board of Insurance)
from an agent or salaried representative of an insurance company stating
that the agent or salaried representative is unable to obtain substantially
similar individual insurance with any state-licensed insurance company
269. See Republic Western, 985 S.W.2d at 702.
270. See id.
271. A viatical settlement is
an agreement that is solicited, negotiated, offered, entered into, delivered, or
issued for delivery in this state under which a person pays compensation or
anything of value that is less than the expected death benefit of a policy insuring the life of an individual who has a catastrophic or life-threatening illness or condition in return for the policy owner's or certificate holder's
assignment, transfer, sale, devise, or bequest of the death benefit under or
ownership of the policy.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50-6A § 1 (2) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2000).
272. A life settlement is an agreement under which one person pays compensation that
is less than the expected death benefit of a life insurance policy insuring the life of an
individual who does not have a catastrophic or life-threatening illness or condition, in return for the policy owner's transfer of the death benefit or ownership of the life insurance
policy. See id. at § 1(3).
273. See id. at § 2.
274. See id. at § 3.
275. Id.
276. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.77 §1 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
277. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.77 § 10 (a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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because the individual will be declined for coverage as a result of a medi278
cal condition pursuant to the underwriting guidelines of the insurer.
The rate of premium tax on those insurance companies regulated by
article 4.10 was reduced from 3.50 percent to 1.60 percent, 279 and the premium tax on title insurance was reduced from 2 percent to 1.35 percent.280 Provisions allowing insurance carriers owning Texas investments
to reduce the premium tax imposed by article 4.10 to 1.60 percent, and
the provisions in article 9.59 which allowed title insurance companies to
pay at a tax rate of 1.30 percent were repealed. 28 1 Accordingly, all title
insurance companies doing business in Texas now pay a premium tax of
1.35 percent, and all insurance companies subject to article 4.10 now pay
a premium tax of 1.60 percent. 28 2 The premium tax on life, health, and
accident insurance companies remains at 2.50 percent, subject to being
reduced to 1.80 percent if the insurance company owns a certain percent283
age of Texas investments.
A five percent premium discount applies to a personal motor vehicle
insurance policy for the completion of a drug and alcohol awareness program approved by the Texas Education Agency. 28 4 This discount will not
apply if any person covered under the policy has, within the seven years
preceding the date on which the person enrolled in the drug and alcohol
driving awareness program, been convicted of an offense related to the
operation of a motor vehicle under Chapter 49 of the Penal Code or
Chapter 106 of the Alcoholic Beverage Code. 285 This premium discount
is in addition to the other premium discounts provided for anti-theft de28 6
vices, academic achievement, and certain youth group members.
Owners of single family or multi-family dwellings, apartment owners,
or condominium owners are eligible for a premium reduction for homeowners insurance coverage if the owner has correctly installed a stovetop
fire suppression device approved by the State Fire Marshal. 28 7 A
stovetop fire suppression device refers to a device that is mounted on the
venthood over a residential stovetop cooking surface and that protects
288
against one or more hazards by suppressing or extinguishing fires.
The Texas Health Maintenance Organization Act was amended to provide that each HMO shall ensure that each healthcare plan includes well89
child care from birth, as required by the Public Health Services Act, 2
278. See id. at § 10(a)(2).
279. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.10 § 10 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2000).
280. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 9.59 § 4 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2000).
281. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.10 §7-9; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 9.59 § 13-14
(Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2000).

282. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 9.59 § 4 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2000); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 4.10 § 10 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2000).
283. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 9.59 § 4 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2000).

284. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.03-4(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
285. See id. at art. 503-4(b).
286. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.03-5 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
287. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.33C (Vernon Supp. 2000).
288. See id. at § 1(1).
289. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e, et seq. (1994)
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and the rules and regulations adopted by the Texas Department of
Health.2 90 HMO's are required to provide immunizations for children up
to age six, including diphtheria, influenza type B, hepatitis B, measles,
mumps, pertussis, polio, rubella, tetanus, varicella, and any other immunizations required by law. 291 These immunizations also are required to be
provided by individual and group insurance companies.2 92 HMOs and
individual and group plans are also required to provide a screening test
for hearing loss for a child up to thirty days old and the necessary diagnostic follow-up care related to the screening test from birth through the
date the child is twenty-four months old. 293 This applies to every health
benefit plan that provides coverage for benefits for residents of the state
294
of Texas.
In addition, HMOs must pay a claim submitted by a medical provider
within forty-five days after receiving a completed claim, as determined by
the Department of Insurance.2 95 If the claim is not paid in full within the
forty-five day period, the HMO must notify the physician or medical provider in writing of why the claim will not be paid. 296 An HMO that violates this provision is liable to the physician or medical provider for the
full amount of billed charges submitted, plus reasonable attorney's
fees. 297 Finally, if an HMO desires to withdraw from writing coverage, it
must now comply with article 21.49-2C,298 requiring an insurer to file with
the commissioner a plan for orderly withdrawal. The plan must contain
provisions for meeting the insurer's contractual obligation, providing service to its policyholders and claimants, and meeting any applicable statu299
tory obligations.
An insurance company must also give a written statement concerning
the reason(s) for cancellation, declination or nonrenewal of a general liability insurance policy, professional liability insurance policy other than
medical professional liability commercial automobile policy, commercial
multi-peril coverage, and property and casualty insurance. 300 The explanation must fully explain a decision which adversely affects the applicant
or the policyholder, including the precise incident, circumstance or risk
factor applicable to the applicant or policyholder that violates the insurer's underwriting guideline; the source of the information; and any
other information deemed relevant by the Commissioner. 30 ' In addition,
applicants for insurance under the Texas Medical Liability Insurance Un290. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.9(E) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
291. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.9(F) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
292. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.53F (Vernon Supp. 2000).

293. Id. at § 4.
294. See id. at § 4(c).
295. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.18(B) (Vernon Supp. 2000).

296. See id. at (c)(3).
297. See id. at (f)-(g).
298. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-2c (Vernon Supp. 2000).
299. See id. at (a)(1); see also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.26 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
300. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-2E (Vernon Supp. 2000).

301. See id.
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derwriting Association now have the right to be notified of their appeal
rights at the same time that they receive notice from the association that
30 2
their application has been denied.
Group health benefit plans that (1) provide coverage for medical or
surgical expenses incurred as a result of a health condition, (2) cover prescription drugs, and (3) use one or more drug formularies, are now required to specify which prescription drugs the plan will cover. 30 3 Group
health benefit plans are required to provide each enrollee in plain language in the coverage documentation (1) notice that the plan uses one or
more drug formularies, (2) an explanation of what a drug formulary is,
(3) a statement regarding the method the plan uses to determine which
prescription drugs are included or excluded, (4) a statement of how often
the plan reviews the contents of the drug formulary, and (5) a notice that
the enrollee may contact the plan to find out if the prescription drug is on
a particular drug formulary. 30 4 The plan must also disclose to any individual on request, not later than the third business day after the date of
30 5
the request, whether a specific drug is on a particular drug formulary.
The provisions of the Insurance Code dealing with coverage of treatment for diabetes has been amended to provide for nutritional counseling.30 6 The health benefit plan must provide coverage for a diabetes selfmanagement training program recognized by the American Diabetes Association; diabetes self-management training given by a multi-disciplinary
team; or training provided by a diabetes educator certified by the Na30 7
tional Certification Board of Diabetes Educators.
A health benefit plan providing coverage for mastectomy is now required to provide coverage for reconstruction of the breast upon which
the mastectomy has been performed; surgery and reconstruction of the
other breast to achieve a symmetrical appearance; and prosthesis and
treatment of physical complications. 30 8 A health benefit plan may not (1)
offer a financial incentive for a patient to forego breast reconstruction;
(2) condition, deny, or limit the eligibility of enrollees to enroll in the
health benefit plan or to renew coverage under the terms of the plan
solely for the purpose of avoiding the requirements of this coverage; (3)
reduce or limit the reimbursement or payment, or otherwise penalize, an
attending physician; or (4) provide financial incentives or other benefits
to an attending physician to induce the physician to encourage an enrollee to forego reconstruction. 30 9 Health benefit plans are required to
3 10
provide notice of the availability of this coverage to each enrollee.
302. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-3 § 7 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
303. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.52J (Vernon Supp. 2000).

304. See id. at § 3.
305. See id.
306. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.53G § 1 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
307. See id. at § 4.
308. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.531 § 3 (Vernon Supp. 2000).

309. See id.
310. See id.
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Administrators of health benefit plans that provide pharmacy benefits
311
must issue a pharmacy identification card to each covered individual.
The commissioner will adopt rules requiring standard information to be
included on the identification cards. 312 A pharmacy benefit manager may
not sell a list of patients containing information through which the identity of the individual patient is disclosed. 3 13 All data identifying a patient
maintained by the pharmacy benefit manager must maintained in a confi314
dential manner.
Coverage for off-label drug use is now regulated. 31 5 This article applies
only to a health benefit plan that provides benefits for medical or surgical
expenses incurred as a result of a health condition, accident, or sickness,
including an individual, group, blanket or franchise insurance policy, or
insurance agreement. 316 A health benefit plan that provides coverage for
drugs must provide coverage for any drug prescribed to treat an enrollee
for a covered chronic, disabling, or life-threatening illness if the drug has
been approved by the Federal Drug Administration and is recognized for
treatment of the indication for which the drug is prescribed in a prescription drug reference compendium or substantially accepted peer-reviewed
medical literature. 31 7 Coverage of a drug required under this article shall
include coverage for medically necessary services associated with the ad318
ministration of the drug.
Coverage for craniofacial abnormalities must be provided by a health
benefit plan that provides benefits to a child who is younger than 18 years
of age. 319 The plan must define reconstructive surgery for craniofacial
abnormalities to include surgery to improve the function of, or to attempt
to create a normal appearance of an abnormal structure caused by congenital defects, developmental deformities, trauma, tumors, infections, or
320
disease.
Article 21.58A which regulates health care utilization review agents,
now requires, in the event of an adverse determination, that the utilization review agent's written notice to the policyholder include (1) the principal reason for the adverse determination; (2) the clinical basis for the
adverse determination (3) a description or the source of the screening
criteria that were utilized as guidelines in making the determination and
(4) a description of the procedure for the complaint and appeal process. 321 The description of the procedure for the complaint and appeal
311. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.07-6
CODE ANN. art. 21.53L (Vernon Supp. 2000).
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

(Vernon Supp. 2000); see also

id. § 19A.
id. § 19B.
id.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN.

art. 21.53M (Vernon Supp. 2000).

id. § 2.
id. § 3.
id.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.

21.53W § 3 (Vernon Supp. 2000).

id.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.

21.58A § 5 (Vernon Supp. 2000).

TEX. INS.
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process must include (1) notification to the enrollee of his right to appeal
an adverse determination to an independent review organization; (2) notification to the enrollee of the procedures for appealing; and (3) notification to an enrollee who has a life-threatening condition of his right to an
immediate review by an independent review organization and the procedure to obtain that review. 32 2 Within five working days from receipt of
the appeal, the utilization review agent must send the appealing party a
letter acknowledging the date of the utilization review agent's receipt of
the appeal and a list of the documents that the appealing party must submit for review. 323 A utilization review agent is prohibited from requiring
the observation of a psychotherapy session or the submission or review of
a mental health therapist's notes or progress notes as a condition for
324
treatment.
The Amusement Ride Safety Inspection Act 325 now requires persons
operating amusement rides in Texas to maintain an accurate record of
any governmental action taken in any state relating to any particular
amusement ride, including an inspection resulting in the repair or re326
placement of equipment used in the operation of the amusement ride.
The operator is required to file a quarterly report with the commissioner
on a form designed by the commissioner. 327 A report is not required in
any quarter in which no reportable government action was taken. 328 The
operator of the amusement ride is to maintain these reports for at least
two years. 329 The commissioner is authorized to adopt rules requiring
of the rides,
operators of mobile amusement rides to perform inspections
330
including rules requiring daily safety inspections.

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See id.
See id. § 6.
See id. at § 4(o).
See TEX. OCCUATIONAS CODE ANN.
See id. at § 2151.101.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

§ 2151.001 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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